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policy and the revisions in growth forecasts in spring 2013 when Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke upset financial markets by discussing tapering off quantitative easing. The results of this paper offer some recommendations regarding the policies that could help to mitigate spillovers from (un)conventional monetary policy in the US -and possibly external shocks more generally. In particular, economies could reduce their vulnerability to US monetary policy by fostering domestic financial market development, trade integration, the liberalisation of exchange rates, reducing frictions in labor markets and ensuring fiscal space. Other policies that may mitigate the spillovers from US monetary policy are likely to conflict with the pursuit of other important objectives of policymakers. For example, participation in global value chains through trade in intermediates has helped economies to raise their potential growth similarly, capital market integration and financial openness allows economies to reap collateral benefits from financial globalisation Clearly, a completely closed economy will not experience any spillovers whatsoever, but is likely to grow more slowly in the long run. In these cases, the trade-offs should be carefully considered before any measures are taken. The results of this paper suggest that economies could reduce their vulnerability to US monetary policy by fostering domestic financial market development, trade integration, the liberalisation of exchange rates, and reducing frictions in labor markets. Other policies that may mitigate the spillovers from US monetary policy are likely to conflict with the pursuit of other important objectives of policymakers. For example, participation in global value chains through trade in intermediates has helped economies to raise their potential growth (see IMF, 2013c) ; similarly, capital market integration and financial openness allow economies to reap collateral benefits from financial globalisation (see Kose et al., 2009; Binder et al., 2013) .
Clearly, a completely closed economy will not experience any spillovers whatsoever, but is likely to grow more slowly in the long run. In these cases, the trade-offs should be carefully ECB Working Paper 1854, September 2015considered before any measures are taken (see, for example, the IMF's institutional view on capital flow management, IMF, 2012).
The paper is related to and contributes to four strands of the literature. First, several papers investigate the global output spillovers from conventional US monetary policy (see, for example, Kim and Roubini, 2000; Kim, 2001; Canova, 2005; Nobili and Neri, 2006; Mackowiak, 2007; Bluedorn and Bowdler, 2011) . The empirical approach in these papers is based on two-country VAR models which involve the US and domestic macroeconomic variables of one additional economy (or vice versa) and which are estimated for a few countries only. The results of this literature suggest that US monetary policy has substantial global spillovers across both advanced and emerging market economies, and that these arise mainly through spillovers in interest rates. 1 However, these papers do not shed light on why some countries experience larger spillovers than others. As a result, this literature offers few insights to policymakers that could help them to render their economies more resilient to changes in US monetary policy. In addition, these papers may also suffer from methodological constraints. Specifically, as they build on two-country VAR models they do not account for the multilateral nature of global interlinkages; spillovers from US monetary policy may affect all economies, and thereby give rise to third-country effects and spillbacks that a bilateral model fails to capture. Exceptions to the use of bilateral models in this literature are Dées et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2012) . The former examine the global effects of US monetary policy based on a multi-country New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that they solve using the GVAR approach. The latter 1 Frankel and Roubini (2001) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2002) take a more general approach and examine the effects of changes in world rather than US interest rates on domestic growth and obtain similar results. di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) focus on changes in base-country rather than US interest rates and find that the spillovers to domestic output are statistically significant only for economies which do not let their exchange rate float. Finally, Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) as well as Dées and Saint-Guilhem (2011) examine spillovers from shocks to US GDP growth rather than US monetary policy. use a GVAR model to analyse the global spillovers from unconventional monetary policy in the US. However, while both do account for the multilateral nature of cross-country interlinkages, they do not study the sources of the heterogeneities in the spillovers they find. In contrast, in this paper I set up a multilateral GVAR model for a large number of economies in order to identify the country characteristics that give rise to variations in the magnitude of the spillovers from US monetary policy.
Second, this paper is also related to the literature on the spillovers from US monetary policy to global financial markets (see Craine and Martin, 2008; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Wongswan, 2009; Neely, 2010; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Gurkaynak and Wright, 2011; Fratzscher et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2014) . These papers study the effects of US monetary policy shocks on other countries' equity and bond markets, capital flows and exchange rates, typically at high frequency. This literature finds that financial spillovers are large, and it establishes that country characteristics referring to financial market structure and integration explain a substantial fraction of the cross-country heterogeneities. The papers in this literature investigate different dimensions of US monetary policy, such as conventional and unconventional policies, surprises to the federal funds rate target and to its future path as well as announcements and asset purchases. However, in contrast to this paper this literature does not examine the global output spillovers from US monetary policy and their determinants. Moreover, these papers do not account for the multilateral nature of spillovers.
Third, this paper is related to the literature analysing the role of specific country characteristicssuch as the exchange rate regime or the extent of capital controls-for spillovers (see Philippon et al., 2001; Frankel et al., 2004; Shambaugh, 2004; Miniane and Rogers, 2007) . In contrast to this paper, this literature typically does not focus on the spillovers from US ECB Working Paper 1854, September 2015monetary policy, but more generally on interest rate changes in the country which represents the base country for the domestic economy's exchange rate. Moreover, as they build on bilateral regression models these papers do not account for the multilateral nature of global spillovers. Most importantly, however, in contrast to this paper they examine the spillovers from foreign to domestic interest rates rather than to real activity. Even though interest rates play an important role in the transmission of shocks and in macroeconomic management, ultimately the variables of interest to policymakers are real activity and inflation. And, the empirical literature on domestic monetary transmission suggests that a given change in interest rates does not map uniquely into changes in output growth and inflation (see Carlino and DeFina, 1998; Cecchetti, 1999; Ehrmann, 2000; Georgiadis, 2014) ; rather, the strength of the transmission depends on a host of country characteristics. As a result, these papers offer only limited guidance to policymakers as to how they could render their economies more resilient to changes in US monetary policy. In contrast, the results of this paper identify policies which could mitigate economies' vulnerability to US monetary policy.
Finally, this paper adds to the quickly expanding literature on spillovers estimated by GVAR models. By now, GVAR models have been applied to the analysis of numerous empirical questions (see Chudik and Pesaran, 2014 , for a survey). However, in this literature the information contained in the cross-country heterogeneities of the spillover estimates is typically not exploited in order to improve our understanding of the transmission channels. 2 In contrast, this paper advances our understanding of the transmission channels by moving beyond the estimation of the responses of domestic variables to foreign shocks and by analysing the role of country characteristics for the magnitude of the spillovers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the GVAR 2 An exception is Chudik and Fratzscher (2012) .
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model on which the analysis of spillovers from US monetary policy in this paper builds.
Section 3 presents the results for the spillover estimates as well as the role of country characteristics for heterogeneities in the global transmission of US monetary policy. Section 4 describes the results from a number of robustness checks regarding the GVAR model specification and the identification of US monetary policy shocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Empirical Model
By combining country-specific VAR models into a global model, the GVAR approach introduced by Pesaran et al. (2004) allows one to model the dynamics of several economies jointly.
Unfortunately, the institutional framework of currency unions such as the euro area-a number of currency union members which are subject to a common monetary policy shaped by union-wide variables-complicates the inclusion of individual member economies in a standard GVAR model: the equation reflecting monetary policy cannot be included in any of the country-specific VAR models, as the central bank responds to union-wide rather than an individual member's endogenous variables. Recognising this complication, in the GVAR literature the euro area economy is typically included "as a whole [in order to avoid] being subject to possible inconsistencies that could arise if the different economies in the euro area were modelled separately" (see Dées et al., 2007, p. 2 information for the analysis of the determinants of spillovers from US monetary policy.
In order to maximise the number of advanced economies that I can draw on in the analysis below, I build on the mixed cross-section GVAR model set up in Georgiadis (forthcoming).
The model in Georgiadis (forthcoming) allows-in contrast to the standard approach in the GVAR literature-to include euro area economies individually and at the same time to model euro area monetary policy in a manner consistent with EMU, namely as being shaped by euro area aggregate output growth and inflation dynamics. Specifically, in the model of Georgiadis (forthcoming) the ECB is introduced as a separate cross-sectional unit in which euro area short-term interest rates are determined as a function of GDP-weighted euro area output growth and inflation. In turn, each euro area country-specific VAR model describes the evolution of output growth and inflation given euro area short-term interest rates which are determined in the ECB's model. Of course, both the ECB's model and those of the individual euro area economies are also affected by non-euro area real and financial developments. The non-euro area part of the GVAR model is treated in the standard way (except for oil prices, see below).
Denote the country-specific VARX models on which the GVAR model builds by
where 
Identification of US Monetary Policy Shocks
In the baseline specification I consider the effects of US monetary policy shocks identified by sign restrictions following the approach of Eickmeier and Ng (2011) . Consider the global representation of the MCSGVAR model
where the global matrices G j collect the relevantΓ ij and Φ ij from the unit-specific VARX models in Equation (1). Let v it denote the structural (orthogonal) VARX model innovations which are related to reduced-form residuals u it of the unit-specific VARX models in Equation
(1) according to
where P i is a k i ×k i matrix of parameters to be identified and that satisfies Σ u i = Cov(u it ) = P i P i . The sign restrictions approach to structural shock identification essentially consists of constructing impulse response functions for a large number of candidate shocks v (r) it , r = 1, 2, . . . , R which are all orthogonal (and thus labeled structural), and which are associated with impulse response functions that satisfy the required sign restrictions; finally, one reports some statistic of this set of impulse response functions (such as the median).
To implement the sign restrictions approach in the GVAR context of this paper, I first determine the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix Σ u i of the vector of reducedform residuals u it for each unit i to obtain a lower-triangular matrix P i . I then set up the global matrix P which has the P i 's on its diagonal blocks and zeros elsewhere. The impulse responses to the structural shocks v t = (v 1t , v 2t , . . . , v Nt ) at horizon h are then given by Table 2 . 
Results

Spillover Estimates
The Determinants of Spillovers
In order to shed light on the determinants of the output spillovers from US monetary policy, I consider cross-sectional regressions of the spillovers depicted in Figure 1 and denoted by s i 9 di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) focus on changes in interest rates in countries' base country, which include countries which are much smaller than the US, such as Belgium or Portugal; this may lead to output spillover estimates that are much smaller than those found in this paper. Kim (2001) and, to a lesser extent, as well as investigate earlier sample periods in which spillovers might have been smaller due to lower levels of international trade and, in particular, financial integration.
on time-averages of a set of country characteristics collected in the vector x i : is a crucial determinant of business cycle synchronisation and spillovers (see Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005) . On the other hand, trade integration could dampen the impact of external shocks, for example by rendering sudden stops and current account reversals in response to a tightening in US monetary policy less likely (see Rey and Martin, 2006; Cavallo and Frankel, 2008; Calvo et al., 2008) , or by mitigating the effects on 10 When data for one of these country characteristics are missing I resort to imputation in order to preclude a contraction of the sample. Specifically, for a given country characteristic I impute the missing observations based on the fit of a regression of the data for that country characteristics for all countries for which there are data on the spillover estimates; if the relationship is statistically significant, for the countries with the missing observations I calculate the implied fitted value given their spillover estimates and add error terms drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of the regression residuals. If the relationship is not statistically significant, I draw random numbers from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation taken from the sample of the countries for which data are available. Missing data are imputed only in few instances: for labor market rigidities for Paraguay, Costa Rica and Albania; and financial liberalisation for Croatia, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic.
11 In addition to these variables, due to their particularly large spillover estimates I include a dummy for the Central and Eastern European countries of Russia, Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia in Equation (4). growth once a current account reversal has occurred (see Edwards, 2004 Edwards, , 2007b . Moreover, to the extent that the expenditure-switching effect associated with a rise in exports to the US in response to an appreciation of the US dollar outweighs the expenditure-reducing effect associated with the rise in global interest rates, economies which are more integrated in global trade should display smaller spillovers. Ultimately, it is an empirical question which of these effects dominates.
Financial integration and de jure financial openness may give rise to larger swings in capital flows and spillovers in interest rates. For example, evidence suggests that in particular nonadvanced economies which are more financially integrated and/or which are more financially open de jure are more likely to experience sudden stops and current account reversals (see Rey and Martin, 2006; Edwards, 2007a; Calvo et al., 2008; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) ; also, the adverse consequences once the latter occur are more severe in financially integrated and open economies (see Edwards, 2004 Edwards, , 2007b .
12 Moreover, spillovers in interest rates may be more pronounced the more strongly an economy is integrated in global financial markets.
Finally, financial integration may be associated with stronger contagion effects (see Edwards, 2007a) .
Economic structure To the extent that domestic interest rates rise in line with those in the US, economies which feature a large share of aggregate output accounted for by industries which service more interest-rate sensitive demand should display stronger responses of domestic real activity to US monetary policy (see Georgiadis, 2014 Edwards, 2004 Edwards, , 2007a . Moreover, a flexible exchange rate that depreciates in response to a tightening in US monetary policy may also help to mitigate spillovers by expenditure-switching, in particular by depreciating relative to the US dollar and currencies which are pegged to the US dollar. Also, if its public debt ratio is low an economy may have sufficient fiscal policy space to counter adverse spillovers arising from a tightening in US monetary policy. Finally, more developed market economies characterised by fewer rigidities, market imperfections and informational asymmetries as summarised by measures of institutional quality should be able to adjust more efficiently to shocks, giving rise to larger spillovers from US monetary policy.
Baseline Results
I adopt a general-to-specific approach to identify the determinants of global spillovers from US monetary policy. In particular, I allow the effects to differ across advanced and nonadvanced economies. 13 The results are reported in Table 4 . Specifically, I start with a relatively large set of country characteristics in each group discussed in the previous subsection (column (1)). Only few coefficient estimates are statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Therefore, I narrow down the set of country characteristics by dropping those for which neither the coefficient estimate for advanced nor that for non-advanced economies has a t-value above unity (so that the adjusted R-squared would increase): financial liberalisation. In the resulting model with a reduced set of country characteristics (column (2)), in order to improve efficiency I test for the equality of coefficients for those country characteristics whose estimates for advanced and non-advanced economies have the same sign: trade integration, financial integration, the manufacturing share, financial system competition, financial depth, labor market rigidities, and institutional quality. The test results (not reported) suggest that the hypotheses of equal coefficients across advanced and 13 The set of advanced economies includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden. I drop Luxembourg from the analysis of the determinants of spillovers due to its extraordinarily large spillovers that are very likely to be due to special features related to its role as a small international financial center.
non-advanced economies cannot be rejected. Based on these test results, I replace the distinct coefficients for advanced and non-advanced economies by pooled coefficients (column (3)). Finally, I drop those country characteristics whose coefficient estimates have t-values below unity (column (4) ).
The final model features pooled and statistically significant coefficient estimates for trade and financial integration, the manufacturing share, institutional quality, financial system competition and depth, and labor market rigidities; statistically significant coefficient estimates for de jure financial openness, the exchange rate regime and public debt relative to GDP for advanced economies; and for non-advanced economies a statistically significant coefficient estimates for de jure financial openness. Thus, economies which are more integrated in global financial markets and which trade less, which feature more rigid labor markets, less efficient and shallower financial systems as well as a higher share of aggregate output accounted for by manufacturing display larger spillovers. Also, economies with stronger institutions experience larger spillovers; this last result is similar to the findings of Giannone 
Non-Linearities
I introduce interaction terms in order to investigate the role of non-linearities: 14 Similarly, in non-advanced economies an industry mix tilted towards the production of manufactured goods is associated with larger spillovers the more integrated these economies are in global trade; in contrast, in advanced economies an industry structure tilted more towards manufacturing does not amplify spillovers if they 14 Strong participation in global value chains reflects that a large share of a country's domestic value added component of its exports is used in exports of other countries and suggests that its trade is focused on intermediate goods. The index for participation in global value chains I use is constructed as in Koopman et al. (2010) , using the newly released World Input-Output Database. Missing data for GVC participation have been imputed based on its bivariate correlation of around 0.8 with trade openness as measured by total trade relative to GDP. The results in Table 5 also suggest that the exchange rate regime plays a non-linear role for the spillovers from US monetary policy. In particular, non-advanced economies experience larger spillovers the more strongly they are integrated in global trade if they also feature an inflexible exchange rate regime. An explanation for this finding could be that an inflexible exchange rate appreciates in line with the US dollar in response to a tightening in US monetary policy-at least to the extent that the US dollar is the base rate-and thereby worsens the trade balance. This explanation is corroborated by the result that liberalising the exchange rate is associated with larger spillovers from US monetary policy when non-advanced economies do not trade much: In this case, a depreciation in response to a tightening in US monetary policy does not provide a relief because the contribution of net exports to aggregate demand is small. Moreover, the results in Table 5 suggest that in non-advanced economies financial integration is associated with larger spillovers if the exchange rate is inflexible. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that capital outflows in response to a tightening of US monetary policy are mitigated by a depreciation of the domestic currency.
Similar to the case with trade integration, liberalising the exchange rate mitigates spillovers if non-advanced economies are financially integrated and thereby benefit from a depreciation in response to a US monetary policy shock as capital outflows are dampened.
ECB Working Paper 1854, September 2015 Fourth, I include the VIX in order to ensure that the spillovers are driven by a monetary policy rather than a shock to risk aversion and uncertainty. The results displayed in the top panel of Figure 3 suggest that the spillover estimates obtained from these alternative specifications are very similar to those from the baseline specification.
Relationship to Spillovers from Unconventional US Monetary Policy
ECB Working Paper 1854, September 2015
While the correlation between the spillover estimates from the baseline and these alternative specifications are high they are not perfect, begging the question which of these specifications to consider as the reference point. In order to ensure that the results for the determinants of the spillovers from US monetary policy obtained from Equation (5) in the baseline chosen in this paper are not unique to this specification, I run the following robustness check.
Denote by s * the true spillovers. Moreover, denote by s (j) the spillover estimates from alternative specification j, with j ∈ {w/o dominant unit, FC dummies, ..., VIX} described above. Assume that each specification j of the total S different alternative specifications involves an error h (j) due to mis-specification so that s (j) = s * + h (j) . Then,
where u captures the effects of omitted country characteristics on the spillovers which are uncorrelated with those in x. Next, denote by s the vector which stacks all s
where ι is a 1 × S vector of ones. Equation (8) can then be estimated by GLS to account for correlation of ν within alternative specifications and countries. Equation (8) can be interpreted as a regression of repeated measurements of the spillovers from US monetary policy on countries' characteristics that has improved efficiency relative to Equation (5).
The results for the alternative specifications discussed above are reported in the second column of robust. An exception is the result for financial depth.
Alternative Identification of US Monetary Policy Shock
In order to ensure that the drop in inflation and the increase in short-term interest rates is driven by a monetary policy rather than a money demand shock, I impose an additional sign restriction on the response of money by requiring that M1 drops in response to a tightening in monetary policy. Moreover, to the strong cross-country correlation of interest rates, imposing the restriction that domestic interest rates rise and inflation drops might fail to identify a monetary policy shock specific to the US; rather, the identified shock may reflect a convolution of foreign monetary policy shocks. Therefore, in a second robustness check in addition to the restriction on the response of US short-term interest rates and inflation I also restrict the US nominal effective exchange rate to appreciate in response to a US monetary policy shock (see Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Kim and Roubini, 2000; Kim, 2001; Nobili and Neri, 2006; Miniane and Rogers, 2007; Binder et al., 2010) .
In addition, I consider monetary policy shocks that have been identified outside the model. multipliers.
The middle panel in Figure Figure 3 suggest that the spillovers arising in response to these alternative monetary policy shocks are closely related to those obtained from the baseline specification. Similarly, the regression results for the determinants of the spillovers reported in column (3) of Table 6 suggest that the results from the baseline are largely robust to alternative identifications of US monetary policy shocks. Exceptions are de jure financial openness and public debt in advanced economies.
Levels GVAR
To the extent that the GVAR model in levels involves non-stationary and co-integrated variables, the model in first differences might be mis-specified and give rise to inconsistent estimates. In order to determine whether such mis-specification might have an effect on the results of this paper, I estimate the model in levels. More specifically, I determine the responses of real GDP to a US monetary policy shock as represented by the time series constructed by Romer and Romer (2004) in order to avoid imposing sign restrictions on a non-stationary model. 15 The bottom panel in Figure 3 suggests that the spillover estimates obtained from the GVAR in levels based on the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks are similar to those from the baseline GVAR in first differences based on sign restrictions; also, the spillover estimates obtained from the GVAR in levels based on the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks are similar to those from the baseline GVAR in first differences based on the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks. Moreover, columns (2) and (3) in Table 7 suggest that the results for the determinants of the spillovers are similar when they are estimated in a levels GVAR.
Alternative Timing for Data in Link Matrices
The bottom panel in Figure 3 and columns (4) and (5) of Table 7 show that the spillover estimates are hardly changed when bilateral trade and GDP data for 1999 and 2009 rather than averages over the time period from 1999 to 2009 are used to set up the link matrices that include the weights used to construct the foreign variables in the GVAR model.
Additional Explanatory Variables
Columns (6) to (8) of Table 7 report the results for the determinants of the spillovers from regressions in which the bilateral distance to the US, bilateral trade with the US and bilateral financial integration with the US are included as additional explanatory variables. 16 In all cases do the baseline results remain unchanged. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates for bilateral financial and trade integration with the US are not statistically significant.
For bilateral trade integration, this suggests that the spillovers arising through expenditureswitching and expenditure-reducing effects stemming directly from the US offset each other.
For bilateral financial integration, the lack of statistical significance suggests that the bilateral spillovers which operate through financial channels are considerably less important than a country's integration with global markets. Finally, Table 7 also reports the results
16
In each case, the null that the coefficient is the same for advanced and non-advanced economies cannot be rejected. Distance to the US is taken from the CEPII database, bilateral trade integration is proxied by the sum of exports to and imports from the US relative to GDP taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, and financial integration by the sum of the stocks of portfolio assets in the US and domestic portfolio liabilities held by US residents relative to GDP. from regressions in which the spillovers after seven quarters as the dependent variable are replaced by the trough spillovers. Again, the results are mostly unchanged.
Conclusion
The finding that US monetary policy has sizable spillovers to the rest of the world begs the question whether global welfare could be improved if these spillovers were internalised by US policymakers, in particular given the US dollar's role as the global reserve currency.
At least to the extent that the benefits depend on the magnitude of spillovers, the results of this paper raise the question whether it might be worthwhile to strengthen international coordination of monetary policies and global safety nets (see Ostry and Ghosh, 2013; Rajan, 2013; Jeanne, 2014) . Future research should examine possible asymmetries in the spillovers across conventional and unconventional as well as across expansionary and contractionary monetary policy. Finally, the finding that the global spillovers from US monetary policy are very large is in line with the hypothesis of a global financial cycle driven by financial conditions in the center economy, and therefore begs the question of whether domestic monetary policy in non-US economies has been undermined by financial globalisation (Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; Georgiadis and Mehl, 2014) . Kim (2001) 0.25 to 0.5 G6 "The increase in output in the non-US G6 countries is about one fourth to one half of the increase in US output" (p. 353) Ilzetzki and Jin (2013) ≈1 not specified Foreign impulse response "is similar to (but slightly smaller than)" (p.11) in the US. Spillover estimates refer to sample for 1973 to 1990 IMF (2013b 0.25 to 0. Kim and Roubini (2000) , Canova (2005) , and Fukuda et al. (2013) . 
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A Tables
Group
Country Characteristics Measurement
Openness/integration De jure financial openness Chinn and Ito (2003) .
Trade integration Exports plus imports relative to GDP from WDI.
Financial integration
Gross foreign assets and liabilities relative to GDP Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Economic Structure Industry structure Manufacturing share in total value added from WDI.
Financial system competition H-statistic, Lerner-index, Boone-indicator 1 , net interest margin, bank overhead costs taken from the Global Financial Development Database of Cihak et al. (2013) .
Financial depth
Domestic credit relative to GDP, stock market capitalisation relative to GDP, private debt securities capitalisation relative to GDP, bank credit to deposits taken from the Global Financial Development Database of Cihak et al. (2013) . 
Vulnerabilities
Institutional quality Bureaucracy quality, corruption, democratic accountability, ethnic tensions, government stability, internal conflict, investment profile and law and order from the International Country Risk Guide.
Exchange rate regime Based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010) .
Public debt burden Public debt relative to GDP from WDI. Romer and Romer (2004) the outlier is Turkey, and in all other cases it is the Baltics.
